This paper analyzes the economics of existing mandatory board regulation and the economic rationale for introducing new mandatory regulation and comply-or-explain codes in the future. We relate the value of the firm to the use of employee directors, independence between directors and officers, directors with multiple seats, and gender diversity in the board room. We find that the firm creates more value for its owners when the board has no employee directors, when its directors have strong networks in other boards, and when gender diversity is low. There is no relationship between firm value and board independence. These characteristics of value-creating boards lend no support to popular opinion and the current politics of corporate governance.
Introduction
The three fundamental concerns in board design are to align the interests of principals and agents, to provide information for monitoring and advice, and to foster decision-making effectiveness (Becht et al., 2003; Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003) . However, constructing aligned, informed, and decisive boards raises fundamental problems. In particular, the task involves a wide set of board mechanisms, but existing theory and evidence cannot clearly tell how each mechanism interacts with the firm's behavior and performance. Thus, if regulators want to mandate or recommend more independence, more women, more employees, or less busy directors in the board room, they must do this without knowing the impact of their actions on the firm's ability to create value. If anything, the academic literature questions the validity of the current regulatory practice or has nothing to say about it. Along the same lines, Becht et al. (2003) conclude their survey by stating that ". . . formal analysis of the role of boards of directors and how they should be regulated is almost non-existent. . . . In sum, the formal literature on boards is surprisingly thin, given the importance of the board of directors in policy debates."
Our paper addresses the politics of board design in an empirical setting which is particularly well suited for this purpose. First, the regulatory environment allows us to study the economics of compulsory law in place. Mandatory employee directors for certain firm types represents this case in our sample. Second, we study the economic role of director independence and multiple directorships, which have been targeted by recent governance codes of the comply-or-explain
type. Finally, we analyze the economic rationale for introducing new mandatory law. Requiring a minimum fraction of board seats per gender is a particularly relevant case in our sample. We control for a range of additional board characteristics, such as director shareholdings and board size, and for firm characteristics like risk and unobservable fixed effects.
The existing politics of board design is heavily influenced by recent governance scandals, such as Ahold, Enron, Parmelat, and Skandia. These events have produced a series of regulatory restrictions on the owners' control rights in the board room, such as the Sarbanes-Oxley act in the US and new corporate governance codes in more than 50 countries. The problem is, however, that these attempts at avoiding what politicians may consider the worst outcome (governance scandals) in rather few firms may prevent owners from attaining their best outcome (maximum firm value) in the vast majority of firms, where governance breakdown is an improbable event. 1 There are several good reasons for this suspicion. First, Hermalin and Weisbach (2006) show theoretically that board regulation in general can only improve welfare if there is either information asymmetry between the parties at the contracting stage, externalities to non-contracting parties, or if regulators have remedies that the contracting parties do not have.
The authors do not think any of these conditions are met in practice. Second, the literature on specific board mechanisms lends little support to regulatory interventions. Adams and Ferreira (2007) show theoretically that more independence reduces the board's information production, hurts its advice function, and may also reduce the value of its monitoring function. Consistent with this model, Bhagat and Black (1999) find no clear association between independence and performance in the US. Finally, the evidence is sparse and inconclusive on the value of having employee directors (Gorton and Schmid, 2000; Fauver and Fuerst, 2006) and gender mix in the board room (Carter et al., 2003; Adams and Ferreira, 2008) .
We improve on this situation in three ways. First, we study firms in a regulatory setting which is particularly well suited for analyzing board mechanisms that are often addressed by public policy and popular opinion. These mechanisms are employee directors, gender diversity, independence, and multiple directorships. As for employee directors, our sample firms are subject to Norwegian corporate law, which mandates co-determination in the board. Employees choose one third of the directors in firms employing more than 200 people. Since roughly 40% of our sample firms have employee directors, this cross-sectional variation allows us to analyze the value effect of this mandatory rule, which has barely been addressed in the literature. 2 The second unusual characteristic of the law is that the firm's CEO cannot be its chairman. 3 Thus, CEO-chairman duality is not a shareholder decision, since the regulator mandates separation.
Although not by law, it is also an empirical fact that managers other than the CEO are never directors in their firm. Even the CEO is not a member in two thirds of the sample firms.
Thus, compared to the US, the boards we observe can not formally be so strongly controlled by management.
Independence, multiple directorships, and particularly gender diversity in the board room were heavily discussed publicly in the second half of our sample period. Two years after the final sample year, independence entered the governance code as a comply-or-explain rule, the code questioned the value of directors with many seats, and gender diversity was mandated by law. 4
Our data set includes each director's gender, and it allows us to estimate the characteristics of independence and of multiple directorships. Hence, we can explore whether independence, directors with few seats, or gender diversity have unexploited potential that stockholders will not capture unless regulators mandate or encourage these characteristics.
Our second contribution is to develop new empirical proxies for board independence and for the network effect of multiple directorships. Existing board studies as well as current governance codes classify directors as dependent if they are affiliated, i.e., have a past or present business or family relationship to the firm. According to the Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) model, however, affiliation is not what matters for independence. Rather, it is the relative timing of entry, i.e., whether the director was appointed before or after the current CEO took office. Thus, the existing studies may have failed to find a positive relationship between independence and performance because of a weak independence proxy. We explore this possibility by measuring 2 Firms in the newspaper, shipping, petroleum extraction, and financial service industries are exempted. 62% of the sample firms have more than 200 employees, and two thirds of these firms have employee directors.
3 The rule applies to firms with a share capital above NOK 3 mill (0.35 mill. euros), which means practically every listed firm.
4 A corporate governance code for public firms issued by the stock exchange in 2004 recommends at least 50% independent directors and warned against busy directors. A law passed in the same year mandates at least 40% directors of each gender in all public firms from 2006 on. independence according to the Hermalin and Weisbach logic. Moreover, we construct a richer director network proxy than the measure used so far, which is simply the number of seats the director holds in other firms. This classic measure assumes every board seat is equally important as an information source, and it double-counts when more than one of the firm's directors sit on the same outside board. In contrast, our network proxy avoids double-counting, and treats each seat individually according to its information centrality. It accounts for the direct information effect of sitting on another firm's board, and also for the indirect effect of meeting directors on that board who hold seats in still other boards.
Finally, we analyze the effect of regulation while accounting for board mechanisms that are not targeted by politics and public policy debates, but that may still matter for board quality, such as board size and insider ownership. Overall, we allow for the joint impact on firm value of three alignment mechanisms (inside ownership concentration, outside ownership concentration, and director independence), four information mechanisms (director network, having the firm's CEO on the firms's board, on other firms' boards, and having other firms' CEO on the board), and four decisiveness mechanisms (board size, gender mix, age dispersion, and employee directors). The sample is all non-financial firms listed on the Oslo Stock Exchange from 1989 to 2002, which is a rather long time series of board data by international standards.
This panel allows us to study board dynamics, and also to control for unobserved determinants of firm value by means of fixed effects estimation, which is uncommon in the literature. Our ownership data accounts for every equity holding by every owner in every firm at every year-end.
We find that the value of the firm, as measured by the market to book ratio, is significantly higher when insider ownership is high (i.e., the board is aligned) and when directors have wide networks through board seats they hold in other firms (the board is informed). Firms with smaller boards, less gender diversity, and less employee directors are more valuable than others (the board is decisive). These relationships are statistically significant at standard levels, and the economic significance is strongest for the information and decisiveness mechanisms. In contrast, there is no evidence that independence relates systematically to performance. All these results are robust to alternative model specifications.
As for boards and politics, these findings reflect that good directors may be dependent of the CEO. This runs counter to conventional wisdom behind recent corporate governance regulation, but is in line with recent theory and with the US evidence. Notice, however, that our findings are from a different regulatory regime and, that we use a different independence measure. Taken together, there is strong evidence that owners do not need the regulator's assistance in order to trade off a director's role as hands-off monitor against the role as hands-on adviser. Stronger emphasis on independence may not just hurt the board's advice function. It may also reduce the value of monitoring, which is the board function that has received all the attention in public discussions of board independence.
The negative association between firm value and employee directors questions the claim that owners benefit from co-determination in the board room. The finding suggests there is an economic reason why owners in Norway and elsewhere do not voluntarily share their control rights with employees. Unlike earlier studies, we find this in a setting where co-determination is constitutional law, and where employees are not just on the supervisory board, like in Germany, but also on the executive board.
The lack of a positive relationship between firm value and gender mix fails to produce economic arguments for encouraging more gender diversity in the board room. Nevertheless, a minimum of 40% of each gender was mandated by law two years after the sample period, as Norway became the first and so far only country in the world to do so. Finally, it seems most directors have multiple seats not because they elbow themselves into the board room and become overstretched. Rather, they are in demand due to the information network they bring along. Unlike earlier studies, which have produced mixed results, our results are based on a measure that captures considerably wider network characteristics than just the number of seats held.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic model, briefly reviews the literature, and explains our methodology. Section 3 describes the institutional framework, the data selection procedure, and presents the descriptive statistics. We analyze the relationship between board design and firm value in section 4, while section 5 concludes.
The model
We want to investigate the following relationship between the market value of the firm, the board design mechanisms, and controls: Q = Constant + α 1 Insider ownership + α 2 Ownership concentration + α 3 Independence + α 4 CEO director + α 5 Exported CEO + α 6 Imported CEO + α 7 Network + α 8 Size + α 9 Gender + α 10 Board age dispersion + α 11 Fraction employee directors
We organize the discussion of the model according to the three major concerns in board design, which are to align the interests of principals and agents (section 2.1), provide information for monitoring and support (2.2), and to enhance the board's effectiveness as a decision-maker (2.3). The empirical proxies are defined in table 1. As shown by (1), we analyze the role of board characteristics that are regulated in the sample period (employee directors) or that were regulated later (independence, multiple directorships, and gender mix). Simultaneously, we account for mechanisms that are not candidates for regulation, such as insider ownership and board size.
Alignment
Interest alignment in a board context concerns the firm's ownership structure and the degree of independence between directors and officers. Shleifer and Vishny (1986) argue that the principal's incentives and power to monitor the agent increases with ownership concentration.
Moreover, outside ownership concentration is less powerful than inside concentration, which is the more relevant characteristic in a board setting. Because powerful insiders may become entrenched, the expected relationship between ownership concentration and market value cannot be specified ex ante. 5 We measure insider ownership by the aggregate equity fraction of the firm's officers and directors, and ownership concentration by the Herfindahl index based on all outside owners.
Most of the board literature and all the governance codes argue that monitoring quality improves with increasing independence between the monitoring officers and the monitored directors. This idea has received weak empirical support. Baysinger and Butler (1985) estimate a positive relationship between independence and performance, Hermalin and Weisbach (1991) find no significant link, while the relationship is negative and significant in Yermack (1996) , Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) , Klein (1998) , Bhagat and Black (1999) , and Bhagat and Black (2002) .
This inconsistency may have occurred because the affiliation-based independence measures used so far (Byrd and Hickman, 1992) are not derived from a formal behavioral theory. To explore this possibility, we measure independence based on the Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) model, where the CEO's ability to recruit dependent directors increases with the firm's past performance. This theory predicts that the longer the history of good performance under the current CEO, the less independent the board. Thus, the key independence criterion is not affiliation, but whether the director was appointed before or after the current CEO took office. 6 Consistent with this model, we measure independence as the difference between the average tenure of the board's non-CEO directors and the tenure of the CEO:
where Non-CEO director tenure i is the number of years since non-CEO director i entered office, and n is the number of shareholder-elected directors. According to Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) , the board is more independent the higher the value of (2). Carter and Lorsch (2004) argue that board independence is driven by absolute rather than relative tenure, and that independence decreases rather than increases as tenure grows. This happens because directors become emotionally more attached to the firm and its management the longer the directors stay. Under this logic, a higher value of (2) due to the first term means less independence rather than more. However, (2) also reflects the tenure of the CEO in the second term, which is irrelevant under the Carter and Lorsch hypothesis. Hence, we 5 A common way to account for this ambiguity is by adding quadratic ownership terms in the regression equation (McConnell and Servaes, 1990) . Due to very strong collinearity between linear and quadratic terms in our data set, we ignore nonlinear ownership effects in (1), but reconsider it in the robustness checks.
6 A second reason for questioning the conventional independence proxy in our setting is the institutional framework. The CEO of our sample firms is also a director in just one third of the cases, the CEO cannot chair the board by law, and other members of the management team are never on the board. Thus, although most directors in our sample are independent in the Byrd-Hickman sense, they may not be so according to the Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) logic. alternatively use board tenure, CEO tenure, and chair tenure as proxies in the robustness tests.
Finally, there are good reasons to expect that a positive relationship between independence and firm value simply does not exist. Although directors provide both monitoring and advice, the Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) model only captures monitoring. Similarly, regulation mandating more independence misses the point that "Inside directors are conflicted, but well informed. Independent directors are not conflicted, but are relatively ignorant about the company" (Bhagat and Black, 1999, p. 264) . Adams and Ferreira (2007) formalize this insight by showing that if independent directors have stronger monitoring incentives than dependent directors, more independence may hurt the stockholders. This happens because the CEO responds to increased board independence by providing less information. In fact, the value of both monitoring and advice may decrease as independence grows. Thus, an inverse or no relationship between independence and firm value is consistent with a model that recognizes the conflict between the monitoring and advice functions of the board, and lets information provision respond endogenously to independence.
Information
The value of the board's monitoring and advice functions depends on the quality of the information sources. Carter and Lorsch (2004) posit that since the CEO has superior information about the firm and its environment, he should be a fully voting member. In contrast, agency theory suggests that due to the value of independence, the CEO should not belong to a board which is supposed to monitor him. Because the CEO is a member in about every third of our sample firms, we can test these two competing predictions, which has apparently not been done so far. 7
Whereas the agency logic suggests the CEO should pay full attention to his firm, the information perspective argues that the firm may benefit when the CEO is on other firms' boards.
We use the exported CEO director variable to capture this characteristic (Perry and Peyer, 2005) . Correspondingly, a CEO from another firm (imported CEO director) may have low value, both because he is already fully committed and because he has the same role in the principal-agent setting as the CEO he is supposed to monitor (Gilson and Kraakman, 1991) .
Again, the counterargument is the information idea that the imported CEO director brings new perspectives and makes every director better informed. The net impact of these alignment and information effects can only be determined empirically.
Just like CEOs, non-CEO directors with multiple directorships may bring back information, but may also become overstretched monitors (Ferris et al., 2003; Fich and Shivdasani, 2006) . The latter effect is often a public concern. Fama (1980) argues that the average number of outside directorships held by the firm's directors reflects the value of their monitoring ability.
This simple measure, which is predominant in finance-based board research, is potentially problematic because it ignores the uniqueness of each seat by not distinguishing between n director 7 The CEO director mechanism may be classified under either the alignment or the information heading. We choose the latter, but with no implicit assumption about relative importance.
links to just one other firm and one link per firm to n different firms. It also neglects the indirect links created when the director joins a second firm's board with someone holding a seat in a third firm's board. We avoid both problems by applying an information centrality concept from social network analysis (Wasserman and Faust, 1994) , which has recently been recommended for board research (Conyon and Muldoon, 2006) . Our measure captures the firm's direct and indirect links to directors in other firms, treats each seat individually, and avoids double counting.
The centrality score increases with the number of direct and indirect paths from our board to other boards, and it is higher the shorter the indirect path. 8 The higher the board's centrality score, the stronger the predicted information effect of its directors' network.
Decisiveness
Decisiveness mechanisms influence the board's effectiveness as a decision-maker. Board size, director gender, director age, and employee directors are supposed to serve this function in our model. Yermack (1996) and Eisenberg et al. (1998) document that performance decreases with increasing board size. This is consistent with the hypothesis that unless new members bring new insights, larger boards both take longer time to decide and make more conventional decisions (Gjølberg and Nordhaug, 1996) . This means the negative effect of longer decision time and stronger pressure on consensus must be traded off against the positive impact of a wider opportunity set generated by a more diverse board (Buchanan and Tullock, 1962) . Therefore, the issue is not just whether board size grows, but whether it does with new directors who differ sufficiently from the existing ones. Gender and age are potential ways to create such diversity.
The evidence on gender is scant and conflicting. Shrader et al. (1997) , Smith et al. (2006) , and Adams and Ferreira (2008) document a negative relationship between female directors and firm value, whereas Carter et al. (2003) find the opposite. Unlike in our sample, mandating gender diversity was not an issue in these countries (Denmark and the US). Moreover, our study controls for a wider set of board mechanisms that may matter for the role of diversity, such as insider ownership and director network. As far as we know, age has not been studied in this setting. We measure gender diversity by the fraction of female directors and age diversity by 8 Network theory uses concepts such as nodes and lines. In our setting, a node is a firm, and a line between two firms represents a joint director in the two firms. We define geodesic g jk as the shortest path between two nodes j and k, and G as the total number of nodes. The node i is designated as n i . Using Wasserman and Faust (1994, p. 192-197) , we construct our information centrality measure in the following way: Form the G × G matrix A with diagonal elements a ii = (1 + sum of values for all lines incident to n i ) and off-diagonal elements aij, where aij = 0 if nodes n i and n j are not adjacent 1 − xij if nodes ni and nj are adjacent x ij is the value of the link from firm n i to firm n j . The inverse of A, which is C = A −1 , has elements {c ij }, where we define T = G i=1 c ii and R = G j=1 c ij . The information centrality index for firm n i is:
This index measures the information content in the paths that originate and end at a specific firm. the variance of the directors' age.
Employee directors may influence both the alignment, information, and decisiveness role of the board. Although the hold-up problem suggests that owners should share control with employees who invest in firm-specific human capital (Hansmann, 1996; Becht et al., 2003) , Williamson (1996) argues that since employees have a contractual claim, they should not be residual claimants as well. In particular, employees will defend their sunk human capital investments by opposing decisions which threaten their job security. This is the alignment dimension of employee directorships. As for its informational role, one may argue that because outside directors are better monitors when firm-internal information comes through several channels (Raheja, 2005) , employee directors should supplement the CEO as the directors' information source. Finally, employee directors may matter for decisiveness, as the conflict of interest between owners and employees may increase decision complexity and reduce decision-making effectiveness (Cadbury, 2002) .
The evidence on the association between employee directors and owner wealth is mixed, although most studies report a negative relationship. FitzRoy and Kraft (1993), Schmid and Seger (1998) , and Schmid (2000, 2004) find that German firms with employee directors are less profitable than other firms, whereas Fauver and Fuerst (2006) find the opposite. Falaye et al. (2006) show that Canadian firms where employees are both shareholders and directors spend less on new assets, take fewer risks, grow more slowly, create fewer new jobs, deviate more from value maximization, have more serious cash flow problems, and are less productive. We measure board-driven co-determination by the fraction of the firm's directors that are employed by the firm. Unlike in Germany, the constitution mandates co-determination, and employees are on both the supervisory board and the more important executive board.
Unlike in the Canadian setting, the employees directors in our sample are not owners as well.
Both features suggest that the employee directors in our sample have more power and stronger incentives to make decisions that benefit the employees at the expense of stockholders.
By removing employee directors from the proxies for independence, age diversity, network, size, and gender, we avoid multicollinearity problems and make it easier to separate the effects of shareholder-elected directors from those of employee-elected directors. On the other hand, some predictions do not distinguish between director types, such as the relationship between board size and decisiveness. We account for this concern in the robustness tests by including employee directors in the size and gender proxies.
Our control variables are firm size and risk, which we measure by the log of sales revenues and the beta of equity, respectively. Size is included due to its consistent correlation with returns in asset-pricing tests (Hawawini and Keim, 2000) . Correspondingly, we use risk to control for the impact of cash flow uncertainty on firm value. We measure firm value (performance) by Tobin's Q, which we operationalize as the market value of assets per unit book value. The market value of debt is set equal to its book value.
Finally, the endogeneity problem of most governance studies applies to our setting as well (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985) . Board mechanisms may be internally related, such as when informa-tion production responds to independence in the Adams and Ferreira (2007) model. Moreover, causation may run from firm value to board mechanisms (reverse causation), such as when performance drives independence in the Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) model. We try to reduce these problems in three ways. First, we use repeated observations from the same firm over time.
Compared to using a cross-sectional sample, our approach increases the likelihood of revealing stable relationships. The panel structure also allows us to control for the effect of unobservable, firm-specific characteristics. This reduces the omitted-variables problem (Hsiao, 2003) . Second, the reverse causation problem is reduced by the regulatory fact that board composition is elected early in the year, whereas we measure performance at the end of that year. Third, by including lagged performance as an independent variable in (1), we allow for performance persistence and for feedback from past performance to current board composition (Woolridge, 2002) . 9
Descriptive statistics
Our sample is all non-financial firms listed on the Oslo Stock Exchange (OSE) at year-end at least once over the period 1989-2002. 10 To reduce censoring bias in the tenure measures used in the independence proxy, we start collecting director data in 1986. The ownership structure data covers every equity holding by every investor in every firm. (2) is medium in the sense that the CEO and the average director have roughly the same tenure. Still, there is large variation across the sample, which is necessary for a valid test of the independence hypothesis.
The network measure shows that boards differ considerably in their information access through their directors' links to other boards. The figures for decisiveness show that the average board has six directors, which is a very small board by international standards. 12 Female 9 Since corporate governance theory cannot yet offer a well-defined system of equations with performance and board mechanisms as alternative dependent variables, capturing endogenity by estimating a system suffers from the lack of valid instruments (Coles et al., 2003) .
10 The OSE had an aggregate market capitalization of 68 bill. USD equivalents by year-end 2002. This ranks the OSE sixteenth among the twenty-two European stock exchanges for which comparable data is available. During our sample period, the number of firms listed increases from 129 to 203, market capitalization grows by 8% per annum, and market liquidity, measured as transaction value over market value, increases from 52% in 1989 to 72% in 2002 (sources: www.ose.no and www.fibv.com).
11 Norwegian firms have a less concentrated ownership structure than in any other European country except the UK. For example, the average largest owner holds close to 50% of voting equity in a continental-European public firm, and 15% in the UK. The corresponding US figure is 3% (Barca and Becht, 2001 ). Norway has a civil law regime, which is generally considered less investor-protective than common law. Nevertheless, La Porta et al. (2000) find that Norway's regulatory environment provides better protection of shareholder rights than the average common law country. According to their theory of institutionally determined ownership structures, the strong investor protection is a major reason why Norway's ownership concentration is so low.
12 Wymeersch (1998 Wymeersch ( , p. 1105 Wymeersch ( -1109 reports an average board size of 12 directors in France and Italy, 10 in Belgium and the UK, and 7 in the Netherlands. The average size of the German supervisory board is 13 (Hopt, directors are rare, average director age per board varies by almost fifty years across the sample, and there is large age heterogeneity within the board. Less than half the firms have employee directors. Because they may behave differently than other directors, we measure board size as well as gender mix both with and without employee directors (SizeAll vs. Size and GenderAll vs. Gender, respectively). 13
Statistical tests
Since our data set involves repeated observations of the same firm for up to fourteen years, we use the firm level fixed effects model. The general structure of our panel data relation is (Woolridge, 2002, p. 251) :
where i is the firm, t is the time period, θ is a constant, α and γ are the coefficient vectors for board mechanisms and controls, respectively, β is the coefficient of lagged performance, c i is the unobserved, time-independent fixed effect of firm i, and v it is the idiosyncratic error, which varies randomly across firms and time periods. We observe Q it and the explanatory variables representing board mechanisms, lagged performance, and controls, and want to estimate α, β, and γ while holding the unobserved individual effect c i constant. The error term v it is assumed to be uncorrelated with the explanatory variables and with c i , and all explanatory variables are assumed to be predetermined relative to current performance. Thus, lagged performance may correlate with the lagged error term, but not with the contemporaneous and future error terms.
Since the unobserved c i is constant over time per firm, it disappears when we demean the variables in the fixed effects estimation, making the estimates more robust to omitted variables.
In addition, we include firm size and risk to control for observed firm heterogeneity which can vary over time, 14 1998, p. 248). Carter and Lorsch (2004) find that the average US board has 12 directors, which is down from 16 in the 1980s. Although the largest boards in our sample become less common over time, the average size is very stable. For instance, the 25% largest boards have on average 8.97 members in the first half of the sample period and 8.67 in the second. 13 Although many bivariate correlation coefficients in table 2 differ significantly from zero at the 5% level, a rule of thumb says correlations below 0.7 seldom cause multicollinearity problems. Moreover, Hsiao (2003, p. 3-4) argues that multicollinearity problems are unlikely in panel data settings, since they normally involve more data points and larger data variability than a cross-section. Also, our regressions use definitions of size and gender that exclude employee directors. To illustrate, the Pearson correlation between board size and the fraction of employee directors is 0.65 when employee directors are included in the size measure (SizeAll), but only 0.07 when the size measure ignores employee directors (Size). This suggests multicollinearity is not a potential problem in our regressions unless employee directors are included in the size and gender proxies. Section 4.2 addresses that question.
14 An ANOVA analysis of the the pooled OLS regression residuals of (1) shows that a pooled model is indeed misspecified. 25% of the sum of squares in the estimated OLS error term is driven by fixed firm effects, 8.5% is due to time effects, and 66% is random. The remaining 0.5% is driven by joint individual and time effects. Dropping the lagged performance term increases the fraction of errors due to fixed effects from 25% to 59%. Table 3 shows the results of using 2SLS to estimate the basic model (1) by means of the panel approach in (3). The first column reports the coefficient estimates based on the unstandardized variables, and the second column shows the estimates based on standardized variables, which express economic significance in a more transparent way. Because the standardized variable has an expected value of zero and a standard deviation of one, its regression coefficient shows the number of standard deviations performance is expected to change if the board mechanism changes by one standard deviation. Thus, the higher the absolute value of the standardized coefficient, the stronger the economic significance of the board mechanism. The p-value in the third column is identical for both coefficient types, and we only report standardized coefficients in the following. The Wald statistic rejects the hypothesis that the estimated coefficient vector equals zero (Greene, 2003, p. 107) , and we limit the attention to individual coefficients with a p-value of 10% or less.
The basic model
For the alignment mechanisms, there is a positive and significant relationship between performance and insider ownership. This is consistent with most ownership structure tests in the governance literature (Becht et al., 2003) . The insignificant effect of outside ownership concentration is in line with several board studies, which often find that when more board mechanisms than just ownership are included in the model, such as in (1), the significant relationship between ownership and performance becomes weaker (Cotter et al., 1997) . 15 The insignificant relationship between board independence and performance is consistent with the hypothesis that although more independence increases monitoring incentives, it also reduces the CEO's willingness to share information (Adams and Ferreira, 2007) . The net effect in our sample is zero, suggesting that most boards have optimal independence because they strike the proper balance between being a hands-off monitor and a hands-on management resource.
The finding is also in line with most existing studies, which analyze a different institutional regime and use a different independence measure (Bhagat and Black, 2002) . Thus, we cannot find support for the political argument that the ability to create value will improve if board independence is made mandatory by law or recommended by code. We explore this possibility in section 4.2.
Every coefficient estimate under board decisiveness is negative, and they are all significant except for age dispersion. Although the inverse relationship between board size and performance is in line with the existing literature, it is remarkable that this pattern turns up in our sample as well, which has firms with very small boards by international standards. This result suggests that optimal board size is indeed very moderate. If size captures diversity in a way which is not reflected in the other decisiveness mechanisms, the finding supports the idea that diversity reduces board decisiveness.
The inverse relationship between gender mix and performance is in line with earlier studies that use different models in settings where mandatory gender diversity is not an issue. Thus, this seems a quite robust result. Finally, the use of employee directors is negatively associated with performance. Although the sample firms operate under a different co-determination regime, our finding is consistent with most of the evidence from Germany. This suggests that under either regime, employee directors successfully defend employee interests in the board room at the expense of stockholders. Correspondingly, mandating employee directors causes an over-optimal use of it from the stockholders' point of view. 16 In terms of economic significance, the standardized coefficients show that among the estimates with a p-value of 10% or less, employee directors is the most powerful variable, followed by network, size, gender, and insider ownership. To illustrate, table 2 shows that the average firm has a Tobin's Q of 1.482 and an employee director fraction of 12.3%, the standard deviations being 1.105 and 15.5%, respectively. Along with the standardized coefficients from table 3, this implies that if employee directors increases by one standard deviation from its mean value of 12.3% to a new level of 27.8%, the expected Tobin's Q decreases from 1.482 to 1.325, i.e., by 10.6%. Increasing gender diversity by one standard deviation from the sample mean decreases expected Q from 1.482 to 1.428, i.e., by 3.7%.
Summarizing, the test of the base-case model shows that owners on the board and directors with multiple seats relate positively to firm value. This is consistent with the hypothesis that stock-owning directors are better incentivized for monitoring and advice than others, and that the network of well-connected directors creates value in the board room. In contrast, larger board size, more gender mix, and more employee directors is negatively associated with performance. This suggests heterogenous boards are less effective decision makers. All these relationships are statistically significant, and the economic significance is strongest for the decisiveness mechanisms. Finally, independence and firm value are not systematically related.
In terms of implications for public policy, these findings provide no economic argument for regulating more independence or more diversity. That is, we find no support for requiring by law or recommending by code that a minimum fraction of directors be independent, employees, or of a particular gender. Neither do these findings suggest that multiple directorships should be discouraged. The fact that employee directors and gender diversity relate negatively and significantly to firm value may reflect that, unlike the insignificant independence variable, these two board mechanisms are not at their optimal level (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985) . This means that if anything, the regulatory implication is the opposite of what has been argued in the 16 The lagged value of the dependent variable enters the regression with a positive and significant coefficient, suggesting a feedback from past performance to current performance and current board composition. We investigate the seriousness of this endogeneity in section 4.2. Lagged terms may also produce a downward bias in the estimated coefficients which is larger the closer β is to 1 (Nickell, 1981) . Since our estimated β is close to zero, downward bias is not a serious problem in this case. public: Politicians should mandate less employee directors and less gender diversity, but more director owners, more networked directors, and smaller boards. The independence mechanism needs no regulatory attention from a value-maximization point of view.
Robustness
This section analyzes the effect of including the nonlinearity effects of insider ownership ignored in (1), of not controlling for potential endogeneity by the lagged performance term in (1), and of ignoring the fixed effects accounted for by the panel method in (3). Finally, we examine the robustness of our findings to alternative ways of measuring independence, director network, and board size.
A common way of accounting for the effect of negative entrenchment effects on firm value is by adding a quadratic insider term in the regression (McConnell and Servaes, 1990) . Model
(1) in table 4 repeats the estimates from the basic model in table 3, whereas model (2) expands (1) by a quadratic insider term. The coefficient of the linear insider term remains positive, and the quadratic term has a negative coefficient. Although this is consistent with entrenchment at sufficiently large insider holdings, neither coefficient differs significantly from zero. This is due to strong collinearity as reflected by a correlation coefficient of 0.96. All the remaining estimates in model (2) are virtually identical to those in (1). Thus, except for the local effect on the insider term, whether or not we account for entrenchment effects has no impact on our findings.
The base-case model in (1) has the lagged value of the dependent variable as one of its independent variables. This allows for feedback from past performance to both current performance and to current board design (Woolridge, 2002) . Since model (3) ignores this feature, any difference between the estimates in (1) and (3) would reflect that the board mechanisms are at least partially driven by performance. The table shows that insider ownership becomes insignificant when we make no explicit endogeneity control. Notice, however, that the statistical significance and the relative importance of all the remaining board mechanisms is unchanged.
Along with the finding that the lagged term is significant in (1), we conclude that there is endogeneity in terms of reverse causation, but that the effect is moderate. This is possibly due to the institutional feature that the board is chosen quite some time before performance is measured.
If we ignore the time-series nature of the data and instead use a pooled cross-section approach, we would disregard possible correlation between observable and non-observable variables in general and unobserved heterogeneity between firms in particular. It is well known that the more important these effects, the more the estimates from a pooled regression will be biased and inefficient (Hsiao, 2003) . Models (4) and (5) use OLS to estimate model (1) on the pooled (i.e., un-demeaned) sample. The important change in the estimates going from (1) to (4) occurs for the decisiveness mechanism, where neither employee directors nor gender is significant anymore. In model (5), which also ignores the endogeneity control through lagged performance, employee directors not only changes sign, but becomes significantly positive. Also, ownership concentration is significantly negative. These findings show that the ability to control for unobservable fixed effects is important for uncovering the true relationship between board mechanisms and firm value. Stated differently, the deviation between the panel estimates and the pooled estimates reflects the severity of the omitted-variables problem.
Whereas table 1 specifies alternative empirical proxies for several theoretical concepts, every regression model used so far uses just one set. Table 5 shows the robustness of our findings to alternative ways of measuring board independence, director network, gender mix, and board size.
The independence measure defined in expression (2) is based on the Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) logic that what matters is the tenure of non-CEO directors vs. the tenure of the CEO. Carter and Lorsch (2004) argue that board independence concerns absolute tenure rather than relative, and that independence decreases rather than increases as tenure grows. We test this competing hypothesis by alternatively operationalizing independence as board tenure, CEO tenure, and chairman tenure. Under the Carter-Lorsch hypothesis, the expected relationship to firm value is negative for board and chairman tenure and zero for CEO tenure.
The second alternative operationalization is for the director network variable. Unlike our more elaborate proxy, existing papers simply use the average number of outside directorships.
We expect the estimated coefficient of this more coarse measure to have the same sign as our proxy, but to be less significant economically and statistically. Table 5 shows the results of re-estimating the fixed effects model (1) under alternative proxies for independence (models (1)-(3)), director network (model (4)) and for one combination of the two (model (5)). Model (6) is the base-case from table 3. Comparing the estimates of the base-case model (6) to those using alternative empirical proxies in models (1)-(5), the results are practically identical. This suggests that the base case results are not driven by the choice of a more comprehensive alternative to the classic network measure (Fama, 1980) . Neither are they due to an independence measure which uses relative rather than absolute tenure.
It may be argued that if we are concerned with the value effect of board size or gender diversity, it does not matter whether directors are elected by shareholders or employees.
Due to potential multicollinearity and the desire to distinguish between stockholder-driven and employee-driven explanations, however, we have so far excluded employee directors from the gender and board size variables. Table 6 reestimates the base-case model, letting these two board characteristics reflect all the board's directors rather than only those elected by stockholders.
The results change for the decisiveness mechanisms, where gender becomes insignificant and employee directors becomes weaker economically. This is as expected, since the value effect of what used to be in the employee directors variable only (model B) is now spread out over three variables (model A), watering down the separate effects of gender and employee directors.
Thus, including employee directors in the definition of size and gender prevents us from telling whether it is these two board characteristics per se interact with performance or whether we measure the effect of employee directors working indirectly through size and gender.
Overall, the robustness tests have shown that alternative ways of operationalizing independence, information network, gender diversity, and board size have no fundamental effect on the interaction between firm value and board characteristics that are targeted by public policy.
Moreover, not controlling for endogeneity or for unobservable firm-specific effects biases the estimates. These results strengthen our belief in the findings from the base-case model in table 3.
Conclusions
This paper has analyzed the politics of corporate governance in an empirical setting which allows us to study the economic rationale of existing and future board regulation. We find that the current politics of board design cannot be justified by market value arguments. In particular, our data provides no convincing economic reason for requiring by law or code that a minimum fraction of the firm's directors be independent, be employees, be of a certain gender, or only hold a few directorships. Rather, our evidence is consistent with the notion that owners design boards with the proper mix of hands-off monitors and hands-on advisers, that employees successfully protect their interests at the expense of capital providers, that heterogenous boards in terms of gender are less effective decision makers, and that multiple directorships create valuable networks. If anything, the regulatory implications are the opposite of the current rule.
From the owners' point of view, regulators should rather ignore independence and encourage less gender diversity, fewer employee directors, and more directors with multiple seats. The number of directors Size
The number of non-employee directors GenderAll
The proportion of female directors Gender
The proportion of shareholder-elected female directors Board age dispersion The standard deviation of director age Number of employee directors The number of directors elected by and from the employees Employee directors
The fraction of employe directors, measured as the number of employee directors divided by the number of directors Controls Firm size
The natural logarithm of sales revenues Risk The firm's equity beta, estimated as the standardized covariance with the OSE total index, using daily stock returns data over the past two years Firm value Q Market value of assets divided by its book value Table 3 The relationship between firm value, board design mechanisms, and controls in the base-case model. (1) and (3) as estimated with 2SLS. The dependent variable is Tobin's Q, which we measure as the market value of the firm over its book value. Every variable is time demeaned by subtracting a given firm's observation in a given year from the firm's overall mean across the years. The first column reports unstandardized (regular) coefficient estimates. The second column shows the estimates based on the standardized variables, which we construct by deducting each observation from its mean value and dividing by its standard deviation for that firm. The p-value in the third column is identical for the unstandardized and the standardized coefficient. Table 5 Alternative proxies for board independence and director network.
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